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QUASI-REGULATION OF A DEREGULATED
INDUSTRY BY A SAFETY AGENCY
LEONARD A. CERUZZI*
I. INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK
T HE TITLE of this article presents its hypothesis - the
existence of an anomaly with respect to airline deregu-
lation. The purpose of this article is to explore that hy-
pothesis, describe some of the various issues related to it,
and perhaps provoke further debate and discussion of
these issues.
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) was created by
Congress as an independent federal regulatory agency in
1958.1 The catalyst behind the creation of the FAA was
the mid-air collision between two air carriers over the
Grand Canyon in June 1956. This disaster focused atten-
tion on aviation safety issues at the beginning of the jet
age, especially the need for comprehensive federal regula-
tion to effect the consolidation of air traffic control and
the need for unified management of the navigable
airspace.2
Twenty years after the the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
and created the FAA. The two decades between 1938 and
1958 were generally marked by a diffusion of federal au-
* B.S. 1960, Fordham University; M.A. 1961, University of Denver; LL.B. 1967,
University of Connecticut.
I See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1522 (1982)).
" See S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3741.
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thority, uncertain governmental roles, and repeated major
organizational changes. Two specific points surrounding
the passage of the 1958 Act are noteworthy. First, when
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, it left
the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act virtually unchanged in all
aspects of air carrier economic regulation. 4 This deliber-
ate action by Congress made clear its intention to make
no change in the law with respect to air carrier economic
regulation. 5
Second, with the passage of the 1958 Act, Congress
clarified the responsibilities and functions of the govern-
mental agencies involved. Prior to enactment of the Air-
line Deregulation Act in 1978, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) regulated economic issues, specifically air
carrier rates and routes, while the FAA regulated air
safety issues.6 The primary focus of the 1958 Act was to
eliminate the then existing confusion and uncertainty
:1 The 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act created a Civil Aeronautics Authority consist-
ing of a five member board and a semi-independent Air Safety Board. Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977, repealed by Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). At the same time the United States Post Office had
independent authority with respect to routes and rates for the carriage of mail.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958). Within two
years, Reorganization Plans III and IV of 1940 split the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity into two segments. Reorg. Plan Nos. III, IV of 1940, 3 C.F.R. 1298, 1301
(1940), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1020, 1022 (1982), and in 54 Stat. 1231, 1234
(1940). One segment became the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which focused
its attention on economic issues. Reorg. Plan No. IV of 1940, 3 C.F.R. 1302
(1940), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 1022 (1982), and in 54 Stat. 1234 (1940). The
Air Safety Board was abolished and many of its functions were transferred to the
Department of Commerce. Id.; see generally 3 J. WILsoN, TURBULENCE ALoFr
(1979) (discussing changes in aviation between 1938 and 1953).
Title IV of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was essentially taken intact and
made into Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. See Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, ch. 601, §§ 401-416, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1301 (1982)).
See S. REP. No. 1811, supra note 2; H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note 2.
The FAA's authority to regulate air safety is contained in Title III and VI
respectively of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)); see
also 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1341-1359 (1982) (repealed in part 1982) (setting forth the
duties and powers of the FAA Administrator); 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1421-1432
(1982) (discussing safety regulation).
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caused by the diffusion of federal authority, and to create
a structure within which the respective roles of the in-
volved governmental agencies were clearly delineated.
The areas of responsibility vested in the FAA were clearly
focused on air safety. First, air traffic regulation and man-
agement of the use of the navigable airspace became pri-
mary responsibilities of the newly created FAA under the
1958 Act. 7 Second, Congress vested the authority for es-
tablishing regulatory standards to effect aviation safety,
previously the responsibility of the Air Safety Board, in
the FAA.8
The focus on aviation safety remains central to and the
essential raison d'etre of the FAA. 9 When the Airline De-
regulation Act was signed into law on October 24, 1978, it
constituted the first change in the economic regulation of
aviation in the four decades since the enactment of the
7 Both Senate Report No. 1811 and House Report No. 2360 make this point
emphatically. See supra note 2. With respect to air traffic control and use of the
navigable airspace, Senate Report No. 1811 states that the objective of the legisla-
tion is to place "unquestionable authority for all aspects of airspace management
in the Administrator" by vesting in him "plenary authority in the matter of air
traffic rules." S. REP. No. 1811, supra note 2, at 14-15. Page two of House Report
No. 2360 uses the same term, describing the effect of the legislation as placing in
the newly created FAA "plenary authority to ... [a]llocate airspace and control its
use." H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note 2, at 2.
" Title VI was essentially a reenactment of the provisions in the 1938 Act. See
supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. The 1938 Act placed safety regulatory
authority in the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which had subsequently been dif-
fused by the 1940 Reorganization Plans; see supra note 3 for a discussion of diffu-
sion of authority effected by the 1940 Reorganization Plans.
1, In 1966, Congress created the Department of Transportation and transferred
the then independent FAA into the Department. See Department of Transporta-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 2, 80 Stat. 931 (1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1651 (1966) (repealed 1983)). Aviation safety remained the responsibility of the
FAA. Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat. 2416 (1983) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 106
(1982)). After transferring all authority which the 1958 Act placed in the Admin-
istrator of the FAA to the Secretary of Transportation, Congress specifically pro-
vided that functions, powers, and duties relating to aviation safety as set forth in
enumerated sections of Title III, involving air traffic control and airspace manage-
ment, and all of Title VI, were vested in the Administrator of the FAA. See Pub. L.
No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348
(1982) (discussing airspace control and facilities)); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1655(c)(1)
(1982) (transfer of powers and authority from the FAA to the Secretary of
Transportation).
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1938 Civil Aeronautics Act.' 0 The objective of deregula-
tion was to increase competition by encouraging the entry
of new carriers into the market place and the development
of innovative services to provide the traveling public with
a greater variety of improved aeronautical services and re-
duced fares."1 The changes in commercial aviation in the
decade since the enactment of the Deregulation Act have
been both substantial and dramatic.
In the past decade, the number of air carriers has al-
most doubled from thirty-six prior to deregulation in
1978, to sixty-nine in 1988. During this same time period
there have been over sixty mergers and acquisitions in-
volving air carriers. Furthermore, the growth in the vol-
ume and variety of aviation services has been explosive.
Not only has there been a substantial increase in the
number of persons traveling by air, but overnight small
package delivery services have developed and regional air
carrier commuter services have also grown in the past ten
years. ' 2
In contrast to the action taken in conjunction with the
1958 Act which simply left Title IV from the 1938 Act in-
tact, the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act focuses exclusively
on revising Title IV. In fact, the 1978 Act is virtually a
converse parallel of the 1958 Act since in 1978 the subject
areas of air traffic control, airspace management, and air
safety were unaffected while the entire economic structure
established by Title IV was changed. The 1978 Act ex-
plicitly asserts that the maintenance of safety is the high-
", Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302 (1982)). The 1978 Act amended Title IV of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in a variety of ways. The 1978 Act applied concepts
of dormant route authority and automatic market entry, which led to the phased
extinction of the Civil Aeronautics Board as a route and rate authority and to its
eventual abolition as a federal regulatory agency. See Civil Aeronautics Board
Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 1551 (1982)).
" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(3), (4), (9), (10) (1982).
"- See generally FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., NAT'L. AIR-
SPACE SYSTEM PLAN (1987) (discussing demand on the airspace system, the ATC
systems, ground-to-air systems, interfacility communications, and maintenance
and operations support systems); see infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
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est priority and any deterioration in aviation safety is to be
prevented. 13
The premise underlying deregulation is that eliminat-
ing the constraints of governmental economic regulatory
judgments and protection in order to remove artificial or
bureaucratic restrictions and limitations on the exercise of
imaginative and effective business judgments, will enable
competitive market forces to work more efficiently and ef-
fectively.14 One latent assumption behind this premise is
that aeronautical capacity will grow and expand to meet
and satisfy demand. If, however, demand increases and
substantial growth occurs without a similar increase in ca-
pacity to meet that demand, the result will be congestion
and delay. 15
The source of many of the current issues facing aviation
can be traced to the success of deregulation in providing
an expanded volume and variety of aeronautical services
to the public. This success also demonstrated the validity
of the cliche that the national air transportation system is
finite; it has limited capacity, and when that capacity is ap-
proached, delays increase. The need for expanded capac-
ity to meet the current and future demands on the
national air transportation system gives rise to issues of
how to allocate the available capacity resources and who is
to allocate them.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 197816 did more than
49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(1), (2) (1982).
, While the validity of this premise may be subject to some debate among
economists as a matter of public policy, the legislative history of the 1978 Deregu-
lation Act clearly reflects endorsement of this premise. See S. REP. No. 631, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1978); H. R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1978);
H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (1978).
In' Public Law 100-223, enacted on December 30, 1987, recognizes the need to
expand capacity in a number of ways. As a matter of policy, projects which in-
crease the capacity of facilities to accommodate passenger and cargo traffic are to
be given priority treatment. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a) (11) (1987). In addition, the
statute establishes that not less than 757o of discretionary grant-in-aid funds are
to be applied to capacity enhancing projects. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2206(c)(2), (3)
(1987).
- Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-904, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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revise Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act to eliminate
federal economic regulation of commercial aviation. The
1978 Act also expressly provided that no state, political
state agency, interstate agency, or political subdivision of
a state could interfere with the federal regulation of com-
mercial aviation.' 7 However, as stated earlier, the perva-
sive authority of the FAA to regulate the use of the
navigable airspace providing for the public's safe and effi-
cient use, remains intact, viable, and unaffected. 8 The
FAA is also responsible for administering 9 other statu-
tory provisions which clearly involve aeronautical eco-
nomic issues.2 0 These provisions are generally set out in
the airport grant-in-aid authorization statutes. 2' The re-
sult is to place the FAA, an agency whose expertise and
raison d'etre is air safety, in the middle of various aeronauti-
cal economic issues.
II. NATURE OF THE AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
The air transportation system of the United States is
unique not only in terms of its size and diversity, but more
fundamentally, in terms of its inherent structure. It is a
tripartite system with a wide range of components. The
skeletal framework of the system is created and then
maintained by two very different governmental entities.
The federal government, acting through the FAA, cre-
17 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1982). Section 1305(a) states that "no State or
political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of
two or more States shall enact or enforce any law ... relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier .... ." Id.; see also Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (prohibiting state regulation of
rates, routes, or services for those carriers within the scope of the Deregulation
Act).
'' See supra notes 6-7 and 9 and accompanying text.
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201 (1982).
Id.
2, The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2201-
2227 (1982), charges the FAA to administer all airport and airway programs in a
manner consistent with the goals of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act. 49 U.S.C.
app. § 2201(a)(5) (1982). For a discussion of the subject of the statutory obliga-
tions of recipients of federal airport grant-in-aid funds, see infra notes 79-107 and
accompanying text.
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ated the air traffic control system, and now operates and
maintains it. This system consists essentially of ground-
based air navigation facilities of various types located
throughout the United States. The FAA designs, operates,
and maintains these facilities. 2 Airports, on the other
hand, are primarily a product of decisions by the various
state and local governmental entities that create, design,
operate, and maintain them.23 However, airports are not
solely the product of a local decision. The federal govern-
ment, acting through the FAA, provides substantial finan-
cial support for airport development throughout the
country.24 The basis for this federal economic grant pro-
gram is the congressional finding that the development of
airports is important to meet the needs of interstate and
foreign commerce.
25
2,1 These facilities cover the full spectrum of aids in air navigation: from VORs,
VORTACs, and the related federal airway structure, to air traffic control towers
with their computer enhanced radar systems and flight service stations, as well as
the thousands of highly skilled personnel who design, operate, and maintain this
equipment. See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1348(b)-2205 (1982). The other key air safety
functions of the FAA are the licensing of airmen, the certification of aircraft, and
the regulation of aeronautical operational activities. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1421-1427
(1982).
23 Over ten thousand public use airports exist in the United States. Approxi-
mately 700 airports are certificated for and receive air carrier service, and 399
airports in the United States have an FAA air traffic control tower. Airports in the
United States encompass a spectrum ranging from a general aviation facility with
a single 3500 foot runway, to the many various city and county airparks, extending
to and including the multi-airport structure and multi-runway complexes of major
international airport facilities. Large international airports include LaGuardia,
John F. Kennedy and Newark International (operated by the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey), Chicago O'Hare, Atlanta Hartsfield, Dallas-Ft. Worth,
Los Angeles International, Miami International, Seattle-Tacoma International,
Boston-Logan International, Denver International, and Washington
International.
- Between 1970 and 1981, under the now expired Airport and Airway Devel-
opment Act, the FAA obligated over $4,459,300,000 for airport development.
See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1741 (1982)(repealed in part 1982). In 1982 Con-
gress enacted the Airport and Airway Improvement Act which continued the air-
port grant program and under which the FAA obligated an additional
$4,800,000,000 for airport development through 1987. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201
(1982). The program is continuing under the Airport and Airway Safety and Ca-
pacity Expansion Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-223, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1486 (to be codifed at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2227).
--, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701, 1712, 1714 (1970) (repealed 1982); 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2201, 2203, 2204 (1982).
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While the skeletal framework of the air transportation
system is provided by federal and local governmental en-
tities, the users of the system are very broad and diverse.
Users range from student pilots in small single engine
propeller driven airplanes to national and international
air carrier service provided by aircraft which can accom-
modate over 350 passengers and tons of cargo. The real
users of the national air transportation system are those
persons who travel, whether for business or pleasure, as
well as those who use and rely on the system to transport
products.
In 1970 there were approximately 725,000 licensed pi-
lots in the United States flying 133,800 airplanes. By
1980 the number of pilots increased to 814,70026 and the
number of aircraft grew to 210,300.27 The commercial
aircraft fleet increased to 3,807 airplanes, 2,394 of which
were operated by air carriers 28 and 1,413 were operated
by commuters.29  They cumulatively enplaned
287,900,00030 and 13,900,000 persons respectively in the
United States.'
The actual use of the navigable airspace reached a total
of 66,200,000 operations at FAA-towered airports by
1980.32 By 1992 the demand is expected to increase to
69,400,000 operations. 3 The air carrier fleet is expected
to increase to approximately 3,800 airplanes by 1990, 34
while the commuter fleet will grow to roughly 1,800 air-
planes. 5 Air carrier operations are expected to increase
from 10,100,000 in 1980 to 14,400,000 by 1990, with a
more dramatic growth pattern forecast for commuters -
2 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FAA AVIATION FORECASTS,
140 Table 7 (1988).
,7 Id. at 147, Table 14.
- Id. at 141, Table 8.
,2!, Id. at 146, Table 13.
Id. at 138, Table 5.
Id. at 145, Table 12.
I d. at 153, Table 20.
Id.
Id. at 141, Table 8.
Id. at 146, Table 13.
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8,500,000 operations in 1990, up from 4,600,000 in
1980.36 Domestic air carrier passenger enplanements are
forecast to grow to 471,800,000 in 199037 with commuter
passenger enplanements reaching 33,300,000.38
Statistics, whether historical, current, or forecast, do
not provide a complete picture. The tripartite national air
transportation system is more than numbers, and more
than merely an amalgamation of very different parts. It is
a very robust and dynamic entity. While the different con-
stituent elements which comprise the system are basically
independent and autonomous, they are also simultane-
ously mutually interdependent. Essentially, the efficient
and effective operational functioning of the system is de-
pendent on the extent and level of cooperation between
and among each of the constituent elements, with discord
between the elements adversely impacting the operational
functioning of the system. Justice Jackson, in an often
quoted statement in a concurring opinion, described this
interrelationship in the context of the operation of the
federal air traffic control system:
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not
wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move
only by federal permission ... under an intricate system of
federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a run-
way it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of
controls.39
Before an aircraft taxis onto a runway and before a pilot
operates in the navigable airspace according to the FAA's
elaborate and detailed system of controls, the very exist-
ence of that runway is the product of decisions by the lo-
cal governmental body which owns and operates the
airport. Albeit in another context, Justice Douglas, speak-
Id. at 154, Table 21.
Id. at 139, Table 6.
Id. at 145, Table 12.
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (holding that the
personal property tax assessed by Minnesota on the corporation's entire fleet of
airplanes did not violate the federal constitution).
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ing for the Supreme Court, described the authority of the
non-federal airport owner and operator:
Respondent [Allegheny County, the owner and operator
of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport] decided, subject to the
approval of the C.A.A., where the airport would be built,
what runways it would need, their direction and length,
and what land and navigation easements would be needed.
The Federal Government takes nothing; it is the local au-
thority which decides to build an airport vel non, and where
it is to be located.40
Since the national air transportation system is interde-
pendent, a significant decision or course of action by one
segment of the system can substantially affect and impact
the system as a whole. The passage of the 1978 Airline
Deregulation Act 4' resulted in just such an impact on the
system. One product of deregulation has been an in-
creased emphasis on separate, autonomous, and in-
dependent decision-making by each of the system's
constituent elements. 42 While the national air transporta-
tion system is not so fragile that it is likely to disintegrate
at the first signs of stress or discord, neither is it immune
from such problems.
The abolition of economic regulatory authority signifi-
cantly increased the level and intensity of competition
among air carriers and commuters. Air carriers now must
make individual business decisions in the context of this
new intense competition without the "protection" pro-
vided by economic regulation of rates, routes, and serv-
ices.43 In modifying the economic structure of civil
aviation, the 1978 Deregulation Act also acted as a cata-
,, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (ordering county to pay
just compensation for taking air easement over petitioner's property).
" See supra note 16-17 and accompanying text.
12 The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act placed responsibility for air transporta-
tion service decisions in the hands of each air carrier. Carriers decide where to
operate, how they will operate, when they will operate in terms of the timing and
the frequency of their operations, and which equipment will comprise the compo-
sition of their fleet. See infra note 53.
-:1 A. Lopuszynski, Perspectives On Airline Hubbing In the U.S. (Summer 1986)
(unpublished manuscript by FAA summer intern).
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lyst, effecting substantial operational changes by air carri-
ers which have affected the system as a whole. One
change is the growth of a method of operation called
"hubbing," which is now being applied by virtually every
air carrier.
Application of the hubbing concept provides an air car-
rier with an efficient means to expand service to new loca-
tions44 and increase service to existing locations, without
substantially increasing the size of its aircraft fleet or in-
curring the capital investment costs associated with a fleet
expansion. By scheduling banks of flights into and out of
a specific location, a carrier can connect more locations
together, providing a wider range of services to the travel-
ing public. Hubbing not only makes it possible to in-
crease flight frequency to many locations, but a hub and
spoke structure also permits carriers to maintain high
load factors while transporting passengers from origin to
destination points.4 5 The growth and effect of hubbing
can be seen in the changes which have occurred at a
number of airports. Only a few hubs existed before dereg-
ulation,46 but since deregulation new hubs which gener-
ally serve a single air carrier have developed.4 7 It is
argued that hubbing results in anticompetitive practices
with concomitant excessive market domination and mo-
nopoly power. However, it can also be argued that hub-
bing merely reflects an application of competitive market
forces in the form of an expanded development of a de-
monstrably more efficient and economical air transporta-
tion system. In this system, carriers compete with each
other in a new way by using their respective hubs.4 s
Id.
Id.; Coggin, Hub and Spoke Scheduling Versus Direct Flights, 13 ANNUAL FAA Avi-
ATION FORECAST CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 32 (Feb. 1988).
- A. Lupuszynaki, supra note 43 at 6-7. Hubs existing prior to deregulation
included Chicago O'Hare, Atlanta, Dallas-Ft. Worth, and Denver. Id.
,7 Id. at 11. After deregulation, new hubs developed at Newark, Baltimore,
Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham, Nashville, Memphis, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City,
Washington-Dulles, and Kansas City. Id. at 11, 17.
11 Compare 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(7) (1982) (discussing the duty to consider
the "prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive practices")
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Since deregulation, the services provided by regional
air carriers, or commuters, have changed significantly.
Not only do commuters provide service to locations which
a major air carrier has left for profitability reasons, but
more significantly, air carriers have increasingly begun to
provide support services to commuters. For example,
many commuters now share the name and reservation
computer code of their affiliated major carrier. They also
frequently receive substantial support from the major car-
rier, including: shared airport terminal space, ticketing,
baggage handling and flight scheduling which meshes
with the hubbing flight banks of the major carrier, market-
ing, and the designation and marking of equipment to be
used by the commuter. In effect, major air carriers use
commuters in concert with the hubbing concept to ex-
pand the scope of their market by reaching smaller com-
munities than they would otherwise serve. Commuters
use major air carriers to reduce their costs and provide
expanded service to smaller communities.
These specific changes in both services and competition
in commercial aviation, while perhaps unforeseen when
airline deregulation was being considered, are consistent
with the basic objectives of the Deregulation Act. How-
ever, these functional and operational changes also create
problems, particularly problems related to delays involv-
ing airport and airspace capacity, since the banks of arriv-
ing and departing hubbed flight operations are scheduled
to occur within limited time periods. More significantly,
by fundamentally changing commercial aviation in the
United States, the Deregulation Act substantially affected
the legal relationships between the tripartite entities
which comprise the national air transportation system.
with § 1302(a)(3), (4) (1982) (addressing the importance of the "availability of a
variety of adequate, economic, efficient, and low price services," and "placement
of maximum reliance on competitive market forces," respectively). While this de-
bate remains unresolved, and may be unresolvable as a matter of law, it is cer-
tainly lively. During the 100th Congress there were a number of oversight
hearings on the subject of air carrier service generally, with some focus on the
relationship of hubbing to fares and service.
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This change in turn affected the level of cooperation
among those entities. The changed legal relationships
and related legal concepts are key to understanding the
emerging civil aviation structure. In this context, it is ap-
propriate to analyze the parameters of the new system in
terms of each party's authority, role, and responsibility,
and to describe some of the limitations and constraints on
that authority.
III. AUTHORITY To REGULATE
Although direct economic regulatory authority has
been abolished, not all authority which can and does im-
pact aviation economic issues has disappeared. 49 In ef-
fecting the deregulation of airline rates, routes, and
services, Congress not only abolished the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, the agency which had the responsibility for this
activity, 50 but Congress went further to legislatively pre-
clude economic regulation from reappearing in another
form.5'
v, As pointed out previously, the authority and responsibility of the FAA to reg-
ulate the use of the navigable airspace in order to provide for its safe and efficient
use for the public interest remains intact and viable, unaffected by the 1978 De-
regulation Act. See supra notes 6-7 and 9 and accompanying text. The application
of legal authority remaining in the FAA, particularly the obligation to administer
the airport grant program, along with the required assurances, will be explored at
greater length later in this paper. See iqfra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
:"1 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the abolition of
the Civil Aeronautics Board.
" See supra notes 16-17 and 41-42. Section 105(a) of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 expressly provides that "[nlo State or political subdivision thereof
and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall
enact or enforce any law ... relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
. .49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1982); see also Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1981).
Subsection (b), however, excludes from the scope of preemption encompassed
by subsection (a) the exercise of "proprietary powers and rights" by the owner or
operator of an airport. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(b) (1982). The plain language of
section 105 does not create any new authority or expand the proprietary rights or
powers of an airport owner or operator, it merely preserves whatever authority an
airport proprietor may have had prior to the enactment of the 1978 Deregulation
Act. See Id. The legislative history of section 105(b) indicates that the intention of
Congress was limited to preserving the ability of airport owners to deal with noise
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A. Regulation of Air Traffic and Airspace Management
Deregulation did not revoke, amend, or modify the au-
thority vested in the FAA to regulate air traffic or to man-
age the use of the navigable airspace. Sections 307(a) and
(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, have remained
unchanged since their enactment.5 2 The legislative his-
tory clearly indicates that the authority to regulate air traf-
fic and the use of the navigable airspace is at the heart of
and other environmental problems. 124 CONG. REC. S18799, H13449 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1978).
The apparent objective sought to be achieved by section 105(b) is to protect the
proprietary authority exception described in the then existing case law from
otherwise pervasive federal preemption. See generally City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 635 n. 14 (1973) ("Airport owners acting as proprietors
can presently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise consid-
erations so long as such exclusion is nondiscriminatory."); British Airways Bd. v.
Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1977) (enjoining prohibition of Con-
corde operations at the airport "until the Port Authority promulgates a reason-
able, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory noise regulation that all aircraft are
afforded an equal opportunity to meet."). However, some recent case law appears
to have expanded the scope of the "proprietary exception" to federal preemption
beyond noise or environmental issues, extending that exception so as to include
issues related to an air carrier's route structure and service. See Western Air Lines
v. Port Auth., 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987) (local "perimeter rule," prohibiting
nonstop flights to or from New York City's LaGuardia Airport in excess of 1500
miles, was not preempted by § 105(a) of the Deregulation Act), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1467 (1988). The validity of this expansion of the proprietary exception to
federal preemption is dubious at best, particularly when air restraints (non-stop
flight segments) are applied to deal with the ground concerns of auto and termi-
nal congestion.
.,2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 1. This Act states:
(a) The [Administrator] . . . is authorized and directed to develop
plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the naviga-
ble airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of the
navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as
he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and
the efficient utilization of such airspace. He may modify or revoke
such assignment when required in the public interest.
(c) The [Administrator] . . . is further authorized and directed to
prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of air-
craft, for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, for
the protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the
efficient utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to
safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collision be-
tween aircraft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles, and be-
tween aircraft and airborne objects.
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the FAA's mandate. Both the Senate and House Reports
use the term "plenary" to describe the authority of the
FAA Administrator with respect to air traffic control and
use of the navigable airspace. 53 This broad, sweeping au-
thority includes the latent ability to affect, and indeed vir-
tually manage, a critical aspect of an air carrier's
operation - the ability to operate in and through the nav-
igable airspace from any point to any other point at any
particular time.
Section 307, by its terms, does more than establish the
FAA's safety authority. The statute authorizes the FAA to
regulate the use of the navigable airspace and prescribe
air traffic rules designed to promote "the efficient utiliza-
tion of such airspace."' 54 This statutory language, when
considered in conjunction with the plenary authority of
the FAA to regulate the use of the navigable airspace, pro-
vides the FAA with the legal authority to adopt and en-
force regulations which substantially limit the ability of
now deregulated air carriers to exercise independent deci-
sion-making in applying only the concepts of market
forces and competition.
It is clear that the navigable airspace is finite. The ca-
pacity of the navigable airspace is a function of a number
of different factors. These include the number and type
of aircraft operating in the airspace at any given time and
place, the altitude and speed of those aircraft in both ab-
solute terms and in relation to each other, and their mode
of flight (i.e., whether climbing, descending, or in level
flight). While an individual aircraft, defined as an object
in the airspace at any given time, occupies only a relatively
small amount of the total airspace available, the dynamics
of flight do not operate in frozen time segments. Instead,
5',: S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1958). When the Department of Transportation was cre-
ated in 1968, Congress carved out and vested in the FAA Administrator the gen-
eral authority to regulate aviation safety and the specific authority to regulate air
traffic - airspace under section 307. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1655(c)(1) (1982); see supra
notes 7-9.
-- See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a) (1982).
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the dynamics of flight require a substantial volume of air-
space for every aircraft. In effect, a moving envelope of
airspace surrounds each aircraft, and the dimensions of
this envelope may vary from three to ten miles in length,
from one to two thousand feet in width, and from five
hundred to two thousand feet in depth.55 This airspace
envelope constantly changes, moving at speeds of ninety
to six hundred miles per hour, or from one and one half
to ten miles each minute. Limits on the ability of the navi-
gable airspace to safely and efficiently accommodate in-
creasing traffic demands are related not only to the finite
nature of airspace itself, but also involve the capacity of
airports to handle the movement of airplane traffic.56
Congress recognized and addressed the need to expand
airport capacity in specific legislative findings that the na-
tion's airport system is not adequate to meet the demands
currently being placed on it, nor the demands expected to
develop in the future. Consequently, substantial expan-
sion and improvement of the airport and airway system is
considered necessary, if not vital.57 In order to effect this
,, Pursuant to section 307, the FAA established extensive rules and regulations
applicable to all flight operations in the navigable airspace. These rules are set
out in 14 C.F.R. § 91 (1988) and include rules regulating the minimum safe alti-
tudes (§ 91.79), operation at airports (§§ 91.85-.89), terminal control areas
(§ 91.90), positive control areas (§ 91.97), VFR weather minimums (§ 91.105),
VFR cruising altitudes (§ 91.109), IFR minimum altitudes (§ 91.119), and IFR
cruising altitudes (§ 91.121).
In addition, the FAA established a comprehensive body of procedures imple-
menting aircraft separation criteria which are applied by air traffic controllers to
effect the safe and efficient movement of flights through the navigable airspace.
See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
7110.65E (Apr. 9, 1987). These criteria are designed to apply to and cover spe-
cific circumstances. For example, IFR vertical separation is 1000 feet up to flight
level 290 or 29,000 feet, and above flight level 290 the vertical separation in-
creases to 2000 feet. Id. at 6-12. IFR longitudinal separation of aircraft on the
same, converging, or crossing courses ranges from five to ten miles or three to
five minutes depending on specific circumstances; radar separation criteria ranges
from three to ten miles depending on the location of the aircraft in relation to the
particular radar antenna. Id. at 6-12, 5-15.
-,; Airport capacity is a product of many different factors. These factors include
the number of runways at an airport, their length and weight bearing strength,
their design configuration, and the overall design of the airport in terms of run-
ways, taxiways, terminals, and other related ground facilties.
,7 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1701 (1970),
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expansion and improvement, over nine billion dollars in
federal funds have been obligated since 1970 for the ex-
press purpose of airport development. 58 Since these fed-
erally granted funds can only be applied to eligible airport
projects59 and can only constitute a percentage of the pro-
ject CoSt, 60 the total amount expended for airport devel-
opment is probably double or triple the amount of federal
grants.
In terms of the national air transportation system, a
clear and direct relationship exists between the ability of
the air traffic control system to efficiently manage the use
of the navigable airspace, and the capacity of airports to
handle the movement of air traffic. By statutory defini-
tion, navigable airspace includes the airspace needed to
effect the safe landing and takeoff of aircraft.6' The logi-
cal consequence of this relationship, considered in combi-
nation with the statutory definition and the pervasive
authority given in section 307 to regulate the use of the
navigable airspace for safety or efficiency, is that the FAA
has the legal authority to regulate, manage, and control
the amount, type, and flow of traffic at any airport in the
nation. In fact, a persuasive argument can be made, in
view of the pervasive federal authority with respect to the
control of air traffic, that only the FAA has the legal au-
thority to regulate, control, limit, or allocate flights
repealed and replaced by Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C.
app. § 2201(a) (1982).
- See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. In addition to the funds used
for airport development, substantial federal funds have been expended for a wide
range of ground based air navigation facilities.
:,! The statute permits grants to be made by the Secretary of Transportation for
airport development. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2204(a) (1982); see also 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2202(a)(2) (1982) (defining airport development). Further, airport develop-
ment project costs must be found to be "allowable" as defined by the statute to be
covered by grant funds. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2212 (1982); see also 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1720 (1970) (repealed 1982).
-... 49 U.S.C. app. § 2209 (1982) (providing that up to 90% of allowable project
costs can be funded by the U.S.); see also 49 U.S.C. app. § 1717 (1970) (repealed
1982).
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation
to do what is necessary with respect to the use of the navigable airspace to insure
the safety of aircraft).
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among airport users at any given airport.62 However, this
is not a new or novel concept.
Twenty years ago, the FAA established hourly flight op-
erational quota limits for five designated high density air-
ports.63 The total hourly flight limits at each airport were
based on the FAA's evaluation of the airport's capacity to
handle the flow of air traffic, assuming that all aircraft
would be operating in accordance with instrument flight
rules.64 One effect of this assumption is that some ineffi-
ciencies were considered acceptable since instrument
flight rule criteria are more limiting than visual flight rule
criteria. In addition to establishing an hourly limit on the
total number of flights at each airport, the FAA also allo-
cated those flights among different classes of airport
users: air carriers, commuters or air taxis, and general
aviation.65
The principal consideration was the FAA's perception
that the public interest would best be served by giving
greater priority and preference to commercial operators
in the allocation of "slots." ' 66 Commercial operators pro-
.m2 See supra note 51 which points out that while the purpose of section 105(b)
was to preserve the ability of an airport proprietor to deal with noise and other
environmental problems, airport proprietors did not obtain new authority under
airline deregulation which they did not previously have. An action by an airport
proprietor to establish limits on the number of flights at the airport, the type of
flights (i.e., whether air carrier, or commuter, or general aviation), or the origin or
destination of those flights is not based on inherent proprietary authority which
may have existed prior to passage of the 1978 Deregulation Act.
.... 14 C.F.R. § 93.123 (1988); see also Special Air Traffic Rules and Airport Traf-
fic Patterns, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93). The five
designated high density airports are John F. Kennedy and LaGuardia in New
York, Newark, Chicago O'Hare, and Washington National. Id.
.;, 14 C.F.R. § 93.123; 33 Fed. Reg. at 17,897. IFR landings require more time
and attention by flight controllers, and represent a conservative estimate of air-
port traffic capacity. Id., 33 Fed. Reg. at 17,897.
-;. 14 C.F.R. § 93.123. The Secretary of Transportation must, under sections
103(c) and 306 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, consider the requirements of
commercial and general aviation, as well as the public right of freedom of transit
through the navigable airspace in his decision-making. See supra note 1.
,;- The term "slots" has come into fairly common usage in aviation parlance
since the passage of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, and more specifically,
since the PATCO air traffic controllers' strike in 1981. The term "slots" basically
refers to an airplane's ability to land or take off at a designated airport during a
designated hourly time period. See 14 C.F.R. § 93.213(a)(2) (1988).
1989] QUASI-REGULATION 907
vide services to the general public, which have greater
value in terms of accommodating the public interest than
the more limited value of private or general aviation.67 At
the same time, however, the FAA was aware of its respon-
sibility to consider the statutory public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace, and to provide
some slots to accommodate the needs of general avia-
tion.68 The FAA's adoption of these regulations limiting
flights at the high density airports regulated more than
the use of the navigable airspace; the high density rules
regulated the use of airports that the FAA neither owned
nor operated. These regulations were later challenged,
and the FAA's action was upheld. 69 An important caveat
to keep in mind is that the FAA's allocation of slots
among the various classes of airport users did not exclude
any user.70 In allocating the slots among the diverse users
of the designated high density airports, the FAA consid-
ered the historical percentage of use by each of the class
of users at each airport.7 '
67 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93).
Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1303(c), 1347 (1982).
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n v. Volpe, No. 23,146 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19,
1969) (oral opinion affirming summary judgment for the defendant against plain-
tiffs' claim that the "high density" rules promulgated by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministrator were irrational); see also Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth.,
305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (justifying take-off and landing fees on small
aircraft, and citing I'olpe). In an analogous case, Wilderness Public Rights Fund v.
Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1979), there was
a challenge to a National Park Service decision to allocate rafting and boating use
of a portion of the Colorado River between commercial and private users. In
upholding the Park Service allocation plan and finding that the Park Service's
preferential allocation to commercial users was not unreasonable, the court dis-
cussed the limited capacity of the river and its inability to accommodate the de-
mand for access from all interested users. Id. at 1254. The court noted that the
Park Service allocation plan allowed more persons to make the trip. Id.
7- Section 308(a) of the Federal Aviation Act precludes the granting of an ex-
clusive right particularly at facilities where federal funds have been expended.
This prohibition considered in conjunction with the affirmative expression of a
public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace noted above es-
tablishes a Congressional policy of open access to all users to the extent possible,
but where that is not possible and some restriction on access is warranted, no
class of user can be excluded or denied access. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1982).
7, Notice of Proposed Rule Making 68-20, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,580, 17,897 (1968)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93).
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The FAA's use of slot allocation became more extensive
in 1981 as a result of the PATCO strike. However, prior
to the strike, but after the passage of the Airline Deregula-
tion Act, a dispute arose concerning the distribution of
the allocated air carrier slots at Washington National Air-
port.7 2 The air carriers met under a grant of anti-trust im-
munity from the CAB to distribute Washington National
slots among themselves. 73 When the air carriers were un-
able to reach an agreement, the Secretary of Transporta-
tion took prompt regulatory action to effect the
distribution of these slots among the individual air carri-
ers.7 4  The court upheld this action when it was later
challenged.7 5
The federal perception of what, in a specific factual con-
text, will best serve the public interest is of critical impor-
tance. Giving consideration to the needs of commercial
and general aviation clearly differs from creating legally
enforceable rights in either of the other two components
of the tripartite national air transportation system as a re-
72 Northwest Airlines v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1312 (8th Cir. 1981).
- Id. at 1312-13.
71 Id. at 1313.
75 Id. at 1322. The court specifically held that the authority conferred by sec-
tions 307(a) and (c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 encompasses more than
air safety, and extends to judgments as to efficiency. Id. at 1316. One issue in the
case concerned the allegation that the Secretary of Transportation improperly fa-
vored the New York-Washington market. Id. at 1317-18. In upholding the deci-
sion to distribute the allocated air carrier slots among the individual carriers, the
court noted that the slots were distributed to air carriers, not to particular mar-
kets. Id. at 1318-19. Of significance to the court was the fact that the demand for
slots exceeded the air carriers' allocation and the carriers had failed to agree on
their distribution. Id. at 1318. Under these circumstances, the court found it ap-
propriate and in the public interest for the Secretary of Transportation to resolve
this problem by effecting the distribution of the slots. Id. at 1319.
While not discussed by the court, this decision, in effect, expands the authority
of section 307. The Secretary's decision went beyond distributing slots among
the different classes of users to distributing slots among members of a particular
class. This extension of authority to effect the distribution of slots among individ-
ual air carriers, while understandable from a practical standpoint, has doubtful
legal validity. Whether considered from a safety or efficiency perspective, from an
air traffic - airspace management or airport use perspective, the corporate iden-
tity (i.e., Delta, American, United, Continental) of identical aircraft (i.e., B-727 or
DC-9) is immaterial.
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sult of slot allocation or distribution.76 The absence of
vested legal rights is consistent with the policies estab-
lished by the Airline Deregulation Act. These policies in-
volve the concept that the general public interest is served
by placing "maximum reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition ... to pro-
vide the needed air transportation system," and by en-
couraging entry into air transportation markets by new
carriers and existing carriers.77 In applying the policy
concepts of the Deregulation Act, the FAA has supported
an increase in air carrier service as a means of expanding
competition at a number of airports which were subject to
various restrictions on access imposed by the airport
operator.78
B. Statutory Obligations of Recipients of Federal Airport
Grant-In-Aid Funds
In addition to the FAA's "plenary" authority to regulate
and assign the use of the navigable airspace of the United
States, the FAA must also administer the federal airport
grant program. 79 The federal airport development pro-
gram requires an airport sponsor grant recipient to make
various specific assurances as a "condition precedent" to
federal approval of the airport grant."° The key statutory
7,; The courts have rejected efforts to characterize or treat slots as a property
right. Eastern Air Lines v. FAA, 772 F.2d 1508, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1985); In re Bran-
iff Airways, 700 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1983). Since those decisions, the FAA
recognized slots as an operating privilege and while asserting that they do not
constitute "property," has permitted their transfer by trade or sale among mem-
bers of the same class. 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.221, .223 (1988).
7 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(4),
(9), (10) (1982)); see supra notes 16-17 and 41-42 and accompanying text.
7. See Air Cal. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 618-19 (9th Cir.
1981); Pacific Southwest Airlines v. Orange County Bd. of Supervisors, No. CV
81-3248-TJH (GX) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1983).
79 See Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2203(b)
(1982), amended by Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987,
49 U.S.C.A. app. § 2204(b) (West Supp. 1988); see Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (1970) (repealed 1982).
"" 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a) (1982 & Supp. 1988); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1718(a)
(1970) (repealed 1982).
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assurance required of airport sponsors who are recipients
of federal grant-in-aid development funds is that "the air-
port to which the project relates will be available for pub-
lic use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust
discrimination.' '8
Airport grant assurances are mandatory, prospective in
nature, and describe an affirmative obligation on the air-
port sponsor with respect to its future actions and poli-
cies.82 The Secretary of Transportation is responsible for
insuring compliance with these various assurances.8 3 As a
result, an airport operator who applies for and receives
federal grant funds is not an independent and autono-
mous entity. Its ability to act is constrained by the affirm-
ative obligations it assumed when it requested and
accepted federal grant-in-aid funds. The combination of
an affirmative obligation on airport operators with respect
to future actions and policies and the Secretary of Trans-
portation's responsibility for insuring compliance with the
assurances, vests the FAA with a significant role vis-a-vis
the airport operators and their policies.
The 1982 Airport and Airway Improvement Act not
only requires affirmative prospective assurances from air-
port sponsors as a condition precedent to a grant of fed-
eral funds, it also specifically directs that the
administration of the airport grant program be consistent
with the provisions of economic policies established by
the Airline Deregulation Act.8 4 In the Airport and Airway
11 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1988); 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1718(a)(1) (repealed 1982).
' 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a) (Supp. 1988). The various statutory assurances are
framed in terms of what the airport operator "will" do. Id. The subjects covered
by these assurances include marking approaches and maintaining airport facilities,
exercising control over land uses adjacent to the airport to effect compatibility
with airport operations, financial and operational recordkeeping, and limitations
on the use of revenue derived from the airport.
- 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2210(b), 2218 (1982).
' The statute states that "all airport and airway programs should be adminis-
tered.., with due regard for the goals expressed therein of fostering competition,
preventing unfair methods of competition in air transportation, maintaining es-
sential air transportation, and preventing unjust and discriminatory practices
.... "49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(5) (1982).
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Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987, Congress ad-
ded two findings: (1) projects which increase capacity and
reduce delay should be undertaken to the maximum ex-
tent feasible, and (2) "artificial restrictions on airport ca-
pacity are not in the public interest. 8 5
Findings aside, the required statutory assurance is very
clearly susceptible to differing interpretations when ap-
plied, and consequently, provides fertile ground for wide-
ranging controversy. What, for example, constitutes un-
just discrimination? What test should be applied to evalu-
ate an unjust discrimination claim: the disparate
treatment test with its shifting burden of proof and focus
on showing an unbiased application of lawful reasons, 86
or the disparate impact test which focuses on conse-
quences rather than rationale?8 7 What constitutes "avail-
able on fair and reasonable terms" is a particularly fertile
field for controversy and advocacy. Disputes over the ap-
plication of these concepts have ranged from the setting
of landing fees8 8 to lease rates,8 9 and have included such
,.- Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-223, § 102(c)(3), 101 Stat. 1486, 1488 (1987) (codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2201 (1982)).
- See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973) (hold-
ing in an employment discrimination action that the employee must first prove a
prima facie case of discrimination, and then the burden shifts to the employer to
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection").
'7 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971) (holding that in a
discrimination action an employer has the burden of showing that any given em-
ployment requirement must have a "manifest relationship to the employment in
question" and that the court must examine the consequences of the employment
practices, and not just the motivation behind them); City of Pompano Beach v.
FAA, 774 F.2d 1529, 1541-45 (11 th Cir. 1985) (city found to be unjustly discrimi-
nating against potential lessee of fixed base at the city's airport and thus, in effect,
granting an exclusive right to incumbent lessees).
11 Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Airlines, 733 F.2d 1262, 1270-71 (7th
Cir. 1984) (holding that the airport's user fees and rental rates "imposed upon the
airlines and passengers a cost for the use of the airport that greatly exceeds a
reasonable estimate of the costs that the airlines impose on the airport").
- Southern Airways v. City of Atlanta, 428 F. Supp. 1010, 1018-19 (N.D. Ga.
1977) (holding that the allocation of certain maintenance and operations costs
among air carriers at the Atlanta airport had a discriminatory effect and was un-
reasonable under the Airport and Airway Development Act).
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diverse disputes as noise standards9 and "through-the-
fence" operation of an aeronautical activity. 91 Specifics of
any particular controversy aside, two points are clear: (1)
with the acceptance of federal grant-in-aid funds by an air-
port sponsor, various affirmative obligations are imposed
on the sponsor with respect to its future actions and poli-
cies; and (2) responsibility for insuring compliance with
those assurances is vested in the Secretary of Transporta-
tion.92 Combining the existence of a duty on the airport
operator with the FAA responsibility for enforcement of
those affirmative assurances establishes a significant role
for the FAA vis-a-vis airport operators.93
It is appropriate at this point to examine the nature of
the FAA's role. In contrast to the FAA's plenary authority
with respect to regulation and management of the naviga-
ble airspace and air traffic, and its concomitant ability to
directly control the users of the airspace, the FAA's role
vis-a-vis airport operators is indirect and limited. It is
more a matter of FAA reacting and responding to initia-
ill, Arrow Air v. Port Auth., 602 F. Supp. 314, 320-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding
the airport proprietor had the power to establish nondiscriminatory regulations to
abate airplane noise, and had administered such regulations in a nondiscrimina-
tory way).
il Standridge Flying Serv. v. Department of Transp., 712 F.2d 1223, 1224 (8th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the adjacent landowner was not discriminated against
when the airport refused to permit "through the fence" operations, which would
allow the owner to construct a taxiway connecting his property to the airport).
w- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(b) (1983) ("To insure compliance with this section,
the Secretary [of Transportation] shall prescribe such project sponsorship re-
quirements, consistent with the terms of this chapter, as the Secretary considers
necessary."); see also 49 U.S.C. app. § 2218 (1982) (defining the Secretary's gen-
eral powers to insure that the provisions concerning the airport and airway im-
provement are carried out).
!... Cii
, 
of Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1529 (upholding FAA order requiring the
city to offer terms to a potential lessor which were substantially the same as ex-
isting lease terms); United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786, 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (curfew on flight operations by the county was found to consti-
tute a breach of the assurances and conditions in the grant-in-aid agreement be-
tween the FAA and the county, and therefore the FAA was justified in refusing to
pay any additional grant money to the county). The issue of the ability, or more
exactly the inability, of airport users to rely on the affirmative obligations created
by the statutorily required assurances accepted by the airport sponsor as the basis
for a private right of action is discussed infra in notes 119-127 and accompanying
text.
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tives taken by airport operators than an exercise of posi-
tive control.
It may be more accurate to describe the relationship be-
tween the FAA and airport sponsors as somewhat schizo-
phrenic. On one hand, Congress has declared the growth
and development of the nation's airports to be a national
priority.9 4 In conjunction with this declared priority, the
FAA is charged with the responsibility to prepare and
publish a plan for the development and improvement of
the public-use airport system of the United States. 5 In
support of this priority, Congress made available over
nine billion dollars in federal funds and the FAA obli-
gated these funds for airport development. 96 On the
other hand, airports are created, designed, and developed
locally.9 7 The statutory goal "to maintain a safe and effi-
cient nationwide system of public-use airports to meet the
present and future needs of civil aeronautics" 9 is depen-
dent on requests for grant funds for a specific eligible
project being presented by airport sponsors." In short,
the federal "plan" is in reality more in the nature of a wish
list than it is a blueprint. This dichotomy is at the core of
i" 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(1) (1982) ("the safe operation of the airport and
airway system will continue to be the highest aviation priority"); 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2201(a)(2) (1982) ("the continuation of airport and airway improvement pro-
grams and more effective management and utilization of the Nation's airport and
airway system are required to meet the current and projected growth of aviation
and the requirements of interstate commerce, the United States Postal Service,
and the national defense"); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1701 (1970) (repealed 1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 2203(a) (1983) ("[T]he Secretary [of Transportation] shall
publish the status of the existing national airport system plan to provide for the
development of public-use airports in the United States"); 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1712(a) (1970) (repealed 1982).
9l; See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 40 and accompanying text, in particular Mr. Justice Douglas'
description in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. at 89.
49 U.S.C. app. § 2204(a) (1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 2208(a) (1982). An airport sponsor must submit an applica-
tion for a specific project. Although the statute directs that capacity enhancing
projects be given priority status when discretionary funds are obligated, there is
nothing that requires an airport sponsor to propose such projects or to use its
entitlement funds for such projects. Id.; see also infra note 105. In fact, at some
airport locations FAA suggestions and recommendations for capacity enhancing
projects have been summarily rejected.
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the dilemma. The nationwide system of airports, consid-
ered by Congress to be an important national priority, is
dependent for its substance on local, not national deci-
sions. The federal role is indirect rather than direct, a
process of responding and reacting to initiatives and deci-
sions of local airport operators.
A closer examination of the FAA's role in airport devel-
opment discloses that it mirrors the role established by
Congress for the FAA with respect to airport imposed
noise based use restrictions.'0 0 Many locally established
airport use restrictions are based on and related to airport
noise issues. As a matter of federal law, airport proprie-
tors are encouraged, but not required, to prepare and
submit noise exposure maps' 0 ' and develop noise com-
patibility programs for FAA review. 0 2 The statute clearly
indicates, however, that this course of action is discretion-
ary; the FAA cannot require compliance.0 " By statute, the
role of the FAA is limited to a review function whereby
the FAA either approves or disapproves the program de-
veloped by the airport proprietor and submitted for re-
view. '4 Just as the FAA has no authority to create a noise
plan for a particular airport or to require the airport pro-
-, See Blackman & Freeman, The Local Environmental Consequences oflmunicipalAir-
ports Used in Interstate Commerce: . Subject of Federal Mandate?, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM.
375 (1987); Ellett, The Aational Air Transportation System: Design by City Hall?, 53 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1 (1987); see also Werlich & Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement
Controversy: Magnificent Laws, A.ois, .Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle, 15 Lov.
L.A.L. REV. 69 (1981) (reviewing the FAA's implementation of national aviation
noise legislation).
... Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2103(a)(1) (1982).
" 49 U.S.C. app. § 2104(a) (1982).
DiPerri v. FAA, 671 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that the FAA has
discretion in establishing rules controlling airport noise, and that airport noise
abatement is an issue to be addressed by the proprietor); 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2103(a)(1) (1982).
.... 49 U.S.C. app. § 2104(b) (1982). In the airport noise area, the criteria that
the FAA can apply in its review process is statutorily limited, as is the time period
within which the review must occur or the airport sponsor's program is approved
as a matter of law. Id. In the area of airport development, the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982 describes the airport grant project application and ap-
proval process applied by FAA when a grant request is received. 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2208 (1982); see also City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
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prietor to create such a plan, and despite the fact that the
FAA is charged with responsibility for developing a na-
tional airport system plan, the FAA has no authority to
create, design, or implement an airport development plan
for an airport operator. The FAA's role is constrained in
both the airport noise and airport development areas.
The statutory authority available to the FAA to make
judgments with respect to the selection of projects to be
implemented is limited to approval or disapproval of what
the airport proprietor proposes.1 0
5
Returning to the central point of this article, although
Congress abolished direct economic regulatory authority,
not all economic regulatory authority has disappeared.
The confluence of the plenary authority of the FAA to
regulate the use of the navigable airspace, including the
authority to exercise direct operational control over air
traffic, and the FAA's more limited, indirect authority to
review and respond to particular restrictive airport actions
in the context of enforcing the grant assurance obliga-
tions of an airport operator has resulted in the FAA, an
aviation safety agency, becoming an indirect economic
regulatory agency.' 0 6 Clearly, this kind of regulation
marks a departure from the role that the CAB played in
the direct regulation of airline rates, routes, and services.
(discussing the application process under the Airport and Airway Development
Act of 1970 (repealed 1982)).
--. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2104(b), 2208(b) (1982). In the airport development
area, funds are apportioned by both a statutory enplanement formula and a sepa-
rate geographic formula. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2206(a)-(b) (1982). The FAA's discre-
tion to fund projects is also constrained by the category of project involved. 49
U.S.C. app. § 2207(d) (1982).
-,; See City and County of San Francisco v. Engen, 819 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.
1987) (discussing the review of a proposed FAA order to suspend current and
future grants to the San Francisco Airport Commission based on the commis-
sion's denial of a request to fly Boeing 707s into the airport because of local noise
regulations); Air Cal. v. Department of Transp., 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981)
The court held review of an FAA action under the Airport and Airway Develop-
ment Act of 1970 was improper because no final order had been issued. The suit
arose out of preliminary findings by the FAA that the airport board could no
longer deny airport access to airlines based on local noise control policy. Air Cal.,
654 F.2d at 616; see supra notes 69-76.
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Indirect regulation is more nebulous than direct regula-
tion and is therefore more difficult to evaluate.
The result, however unintended it may be, is that the
FAA, a safety agency, has become a quasi aviation eco-
nomic regulatory entity. In large part this result stems
from the fact that the FAA is the only agency having any
system responsibility among the three constituent ele-
ments comprising the United States tripartite air trans-
portation system. 0 7  The responsibility of airport
operators is to serve their local community, and they can-
not expand the scope of their authority beyond their local
jurisdiction. In contrast, the responsibility of air carriers
and commuters providing commercial aviation services is
to provide those services that are of greatest value to the
corporation. In short, their responsibility is to manage
the services they provide so as to make a profit. Private or
general aviation, whether conducted for pleasure or in
conjunction with business, has no discernible system re-
sponsibilities. With the abolition of the CAB, the FAA is
the only entity having any responsibility for the air trans-
portation system of the United States.
IV. QUASI-REGULATED DEREGULATION APPLIED
The FAA has some aviation economic responsibility to
give the statutory policies of economic deregulation ef-
fect, 108 and it is important to consider the FAA's options
.... Any assumption that the abolition of the CAB also extinguished federal re-
sponsibility for a national air transportation system is erroneous. See 49 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 301-302 (1982); 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1302-1303, 1346, 1347, 1353, 1356,
1357, 1421(b), 1432 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 49 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2201(a)
2203(a)-(b), 2204(a), 2205(A) (West Supp. 1988).
I'll Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended by the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, established as goals and policies the prevention of un-
fair, deceptive, predatory, or anti-competitive practices in air transportation, as
well as the fostering of competition. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1302(a)(3), (7), (9), 1303
(1982). The FAA must apply these policies in the airport grant program pursuant
to the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982. See 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2201(a)(5) (1982). While this is not to suggest that the FAA's role in air safety
has diminished, or that the FAA has or should become a mini-Federal Trade Com-
mission, the fact is that the FAA has taken action designed to foster competition
among air carriers by requiring that a situation which had the effect of excluding
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in exercising that responsibility. In short, the means
available to the FAA to deal with economic issues are in-
adequate. Clearly those means were neither designed nor
intended to be applied to economic issues.
Prior to deregulation, economic regulatory authority
had been vested in the CAB. The FAA does not have di-
rect legal authority to regulate economic issues. This
does not mean that a vacuum of authority exists, but it
does mean that federal authority in this area is indirect,
limited, and negative.
The FAA's expertise involves the wide range of aero-
nautical technology, such as aerodynamics, aeronautical
engineering, air traffic control procedures, flight operat-
ing procedures, and air navigation and communication
electronics. The FAA does not possess expertise regard-
ing economic concepts and their application in establish-
ing rate and fare structures, marketing, route design and
structure, and service levels related to market demand.
The primary role and responsibility of the FAA remains
focused on air safety.
The enforcement tools available to the FAA were
designed and intended to be applied in conjunction with
the agency's safety function. For example, one remedy
gives the FAA the authority to amend, suspend, or revoke
any certificate issued by the agency.' 0 9 The FAA may also
impose a civil penalty of $1000 for a violation of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act or regulations promulgated under that
Act." 0 While these remedies are appropriate and can be
effectively used by the FAA in performing its safety re-
competition be changed. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for discussion
of the FAA's support of expanded carrier service; see i'fra note 128 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of how a private' cause of action would affect
deregulation.
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a)-(b) (1982).
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1471 (1982) (amended 1987). The changes to the civil
penalty provision of the Federal Aviation Act, effected by Public Law 100-223,
increased the civil penalty maximum from $1000 to $10,000 for air carriers and
established a civil penalty demonstration program permitting administrative adju-
dication of certain penalties. Id. However, neither the nature nor the character of
the remedy was changed, and it remains a civil penalty sanction. Id.
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sponsibilities, their use as a vehicle to effect the resolution
of economic issues is suspect at best.
In the airport grant area, the FAA has the discretion to
withhold grant funds if an airport operator fails to comply
with any of the various statutory requirements or the
grant agreement assurances."' In applying this discre-
tion, the FAA may refuse to enter into any new grants," 1 2
suspend making payments on existing grants,1 3 or termi-
nate outstanding grants." 14 From a policy perspective, the
efficacy of withholding airport development grant funds
from a project designed to enhance either safety or air-
port capacity because of economic issues is arguable. In
any event, while the FAA may avail itself of these various
remedies, and their application in particular circum-
stances may effect a change in behavior, the remedies are
all indirect, limited, and negative in nature. None of these
remedies include the authority to direct or require that
any specific course of action be taken.
Another possible remedy is the initiation of or partici-
pation in litigation." 5 Using litigation to implement or
give effect to the concepts and policies of deregulation is
difficult at best. Apart from the fact that any lawsuit is
I See City and County of San Francisco v. Engen, 819 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1987)
(denying San Francisco's petition for review of FAA proposed order to suspend
current grants and to refuse grants because of lack of jurisdiction); United States
v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding
county's curfew on night flight operations breached the grant-in-aid agreement
assurances and justified the FAA's refusal to tender further grant funds). But cf. 49
U.S.C.A. app. § 2218(b) (West Supp. 1988) (added by Public Law 100-223 in
1987). The statute limits the ability of the FAA to withhold apportioned airport
enplanement funds for 180 days, and requires a full administrative adjudicatory
proceeding within that time period. Any withholding beyond the 180 days will be
dependent on the findings issued in connection with that administrative proceed-
ing. Id.
11 In order to be eligible for a grant, an airport sponsor must provide assur-
ances indicating a willingness to comply with the various terms, conditions, and
assurances required by statute. See 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 2210(a) (West Supp. 1988).
One indication of such willingness is compliance with prior grant assurances. See
14 C.F.R. § 152.103(a)(3) (1988).
14 C.F.R. § 152.503 (1988).
14 C.F.R. § 152.505 (1988).
Decisions to initiate or participate in litigation requires coordination with
and authorization from the Department ofJustice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519 (1982).
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inherently limited since it is highly fact specific and deals
with relatively narrow issues," 6 the courtroom is not an
appropriate forum for the resolution of broad questions
involving the exercise of discretion in selecting among al-
ternative policy choices and implementing the various
means available to effect the choices made. However,
since deregulation, airlines have frequently resorted to lit-
igation to challenge various actions taken by airport oper-
ators which inhibit or limit access to airport facilities, or
limit decision making by airport users.' 17
Litigation over airport access has two objectives. The
first objective of the lawsuit is to prevent the initiation or
continuation of a particular practice involving an airport
use restriction. Frequently the lawsuit takes the form of a
declaratory judgment action with a request for injunctive
relief. While recognizing that injunctive litigation is essen-
tially proscriptive, the fact that policy choices are available
provides some latitude and requires the exercise of dis-
cretion. Consequently, litigation in this area does not lend
I See FED. R. Civ. P. 16. The core of the pre-trial process is intended to sim-
plify, narrow, and focus the issues to be tried.
, See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. City of Long Beach, 815 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987)
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 96 (1987); Western Airlines v. Port
Auth., 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying injunctive relief to airline challenging
airport authority's application of local "perimeter" rule to prevent access to La-
Guardia Airport for flights originating more than 1500 miles from New York
City); Montauk-Caribbean Airways v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1986) (dispute
over airline's request to serve as an air carrier and fixed-base operator at airport
on a year-round basis); City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982)
(upholding the Department of Transportation's regulations imposing a perimeter
rule upon flights to and from Washington National Airport); Air Cal. v. United
States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981) (airline contested FAA de-
termination that Orange County Board of Supervisors must permit new carriers
to use Orange County Airport); Northwest Airlines v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d
1309 (8th Cir. 1981) (airline sought review of Department of Transportation rule
allocating reservations of takeoff and landing slots at Washington National Air-
port); New York Airlines v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Mass. 1985)
(airline sought damages and injunctive relief against county and airport commis-
sion for denial of access to airport); Midway Airlines v. County of Westchester,
584 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (airline sought injunction requiring county to
grant immediate access to county airport); Pacific Southwest Airlines v. Orange
County Bd. of Supervisors, Civil No. 81-3248-TIH (GX) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
1983).
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itself to an action in mandamus." 8 A second objective of
litigation may be to effect a change in behavior. In this
context, litigation may serve as a catalyst, providing an in-
centive to negotiate, as well as a framework which can be
used by the parties to develop a mutually acceptable reso-
lution of the particular controversy. However, this ad hoc
approach to resolving specific airport access issues pre-
vents the development and articulation of a clear set of
consistent principles to be applied in making a selection
from among alternative policy choices. Each separate
problem is resolved by negotiated compromise
agreement.
Litigation over airport access and use restriction has fo-
cused on the requirement that airports which receive fed-
eral grant funds "will be available for public use on fair
and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimina-
tion.,"I 9 The decisions emphasize the concepts and poli-
cies of deregulation, particularly competitive market
forces °20 and the preclusion of local economic regulatory
action. 2 1
In Cort v. Ash'12 2 the Supreme Court limited the ability of
For example, in Alaska Airlines, the court found that the City of Long Beach
limited the number of air carrier flights and allocated that limited number without
the benefit of an adequate study or analysis. Alaska Airlines, 815 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.
1987)(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 96 (1987). The action was
therefore illegal, arbitrary, and capricious, and the court enjoined the city from
enforcing its ordinance or in any way affecting the number of flights. Id. How-
ever, the same court order preserved the "status quo ante," which had the effect
of continuing the limitation on the number of flights which the court had just held
to be illegal. Id.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (1982); supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1982 and Supp. 1984).
49 U.S.C. § 2210(a)(1) (1982).
2 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court cited four factors to be consid-
ered when determining whether a private remedy could be implied in a federal
statute. First, whether the plaintiff is one of a class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted; second, whether there was any indication in the legislative
history of intent to create or deny such a remedy; third, whether it is consistent
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy; and
finally, whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal laws. Id. at 78; see also Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. I I (1979) (holding a limited private right of
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a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit when that action was predi-
cated on an implied private right based on the existence
of a federal statute. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the
Court indicated that a private right of action will be in-
ferred from the existence of a federal statute only in ex-
ceptional situations. 23  In Cort, the Court described a
four-prong test to determine whether an implied private
right of action exists under a federal statute. 24 While all
four elements are important, the first two are the most
critical: (i) whether Congress enacted the statute for the
special benefit of the plaintiff; and (ii) whether the legisla-
tive history reflects or indicates an intent to create a pri-
vate right. 25 Applying these concepts to the economic
issues involving airport access and airport use restrictions,
the courts have held that the principles of deregulation do
not per se give rise to an implied private right of action.
Further, the courts have held that the terms and condi-
tions of the grant agreements between the FAA and an
airport operator do not confer third party beneficiary
rights on the users of an airport. 2 6
A key problem for any private litigant to overcome is
the fact that Congress enacted both the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978 and the Airport and Airway Improve-
ment Act of 1982 for the benefit of the general public at
large, and not for the benefit of any particular private per-
son or class of persons. Furthermore, no legislative his-
action exists to void an investment advisor's contract under the Investment Advi-
sors Act of 1940 § 215 but not under § 206); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979) (holding no private right of action exists under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 17(a); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) (applying the Cort four factor analysis, the Court held that a private right of
action could be implied under Section 901(a) of Title IX of Education Amend-
ment of 1972).
12:1 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
12" Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see supra note 122 for a discussion of the four part test
applied in Corr.
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
12.i Interface Group Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying the Cort test the court concluded no private right of action existed
under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1344(a) (1982)); otlatiauk-Caribbean Airways, 784 F.2d at
97-98.
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tory exists that would indicate congressional intent to
create private rights or to authorize a private right of ac-
tion based on either statute. While these circumstances
make the initiation of private litigation difficult, they are
not an absolute bar to such litigation. 2 7 The initiation of
litigation does not necessarily depend on the assertion of
either a private right of action under the 1978 Airline De-
regulation Act, or implied third-party beneficiary status
under grants issued pursuant to the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982. The use of general federal
question and diversity jurisdiction in conjunction with the
allegations of a federal law violation which causes a bur-
den on commerce or conflicts with principles of federal
preemption or equal protection, should be sufficient to
avoid a motion to dismiss so as to at least get to a trial on
the merits.
After considering all the frustrations and problems as-
sociated with the various available indirect and limited
remedies, the FAA's plenary authority to regulate the use
of the navigable airspace becomes an attractive alternative
approach to implement the policies of deregulation. Re-
lying on the FAA's authority, however, shifts the focus.
The regulatory issues become a matter of applying the
economic policies underlying deregulation to the process
of exercising control over air traffic and use of the naviga-
ble airspace. The very act of doing so however, creates a
contradiction, in that regulatory action to control and
manage the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace
is transformed into a vehicle to implement the economic
policy goals and objectives of deregulation. The result is
economic regulatory action in the guise of air traffic-air-
space rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 not only effected
--T See Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. at 1440 (airline brought an action under the
Sherman Act, the Supremacy Clause, and the Commerce Clause in challenging
the county's refusal to grant plaintiff access to the airport).
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major changes in the operation and functioning of com-
mercial aviation in the United States, it also substantially
altered the legal relationships among the entities which
together comprise the national air transportation system:
airport operators, airport users, and the federal govern-
ment. The assumption that the Airline Deregulation Act
eliminated economic regulatory issues in aviation, thereby
leaving the subject area unregulated and open to the op-
eration of market forces, is false. While some economic
regulatory issues have been eliminated, new economic is-
sues have arisen, and the forum within which those issues
are being dealt has changed.
In the past, the CAB resolved economic aviation issues
in extensive administrative proceedings. Now, the forum
is likely to be either direct negotiations between airport
users and operators, confrontations between the two
groups, or both. In any circumstance, the FAA is usually
brought into the controversy by one of the protagonists in
an effort to bolster its position. As the FAA's role is gen-
erally advisory in nature, the agency tries to facilitate a
negotiated resolution of the specific issues. While this ad
hoc approach has been successful in resolving particular
controversies, it has not produced a cohesive national air
transportation policy. At the same time, this ad hoc ap-
proach recognizes that since there has been no substan-
tive change in the FAA's fundamental statutory authority,
the agency's ability to act is limited.
Essentially, the FAA remains a technical agency charged
with responsibility for air safety. The agency's staff is
comprised of highly skilled, technical experts who regu-
larly deal with a wide range of air safety issues. Neverthe-
less, the FAA now finds itself more frequently involved in
aviation economic issues. The FAA does not have the
professional expertise nor, more importantly, the clear
legal authority to resolve these issues. The FAA, however,
can neither avoid nor disregard the goals and objectives
established by Congress in the Deregulation Act. The
goals and objectives of that Act go beyond matters of air
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safety, airspace management, and air traffic control re-
sponsibilities. They extend to and involve the agency in
economic issues; particularly the agency's obligation to ef-
fect compliance with the statutorily managed assurances
required of airport operators who request and receive
federal grant-in-aid funds.
The FAA has limited negative authority to issue find-
ings proscribing a particular action and a limited capabil-
ity to act to enforce its views, whether by withholding
grant funds or imposing civil penalties. The FAA does
not have the legal authority to prescribe or direct that a
particular course of action be implemented, however, the
FAA is the only component of the tripartite national air
transportation system which has system responsibilities
and the statutory responsibility to apply the goals and
objectives of the Deregulation Act. This creates the
anomaly of a deregulated industry being quasi-regulated
by a safety agency on somewhat tangential legal authority
and oblique contractual relationships. Recognition of the
fact that economic regulatory issues remain viable is the
easy first step. That fact does not imply the failure of de-
regulation. Further, the fact that legal authority to deal
with these economic regulatory issues is limited does not
per se warrant re-regulation. A much easier and simpler
alternative is available.
If, as an adjunct to deregulation, a concomitant private
right of action was available, those persons directly af-
fected by various regulatory or other decisions could chal-
lenge the decisions based on the concepts of deregulation
and the various grant agreement assurances. Clearly it
would require legislative action to create a private right of
action which would permit airport users to directly chal-
lenge regulatory actions by airport operators. Presuma-
bly these challenges would occur when the regulatory
action by the airport operator produced a real and signifi-
cant impact on the airport user, and not merely a theoreti-
cal or hypothetical one. At the same time, airport
operators faced with the prospect of litigation would pre-
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sumably be more careful when regulating areas in which
real impacts are likely to occur. In any event, the present
situation is hardly satisfying to any of the protagonists.' 2
By creating a private right of action, the airport users
and airport operators, who in a deregulated context are
the key protagonists, would either resolve their differ-
ences or else their differences would be resolved by judi-
cial decree. Involving the FAA in economic regulatory
issues, which it has neither the expertise nor the legal au-
thority to handle, would end. The myth of the FAA as the
designer or arbiter of the national air transportation sys-
tem would cease, and the FAA would be able to focus its
time, attention, energy, and resources on resolving issues
related to air traffic, airspace management, and flight
safety.
-- This approach would avoid the prolonged, tedious, and expensive adminis-
trative-legal process in which San Francisco has engaged. See In re San Francisco
Airports Comm'n, No. 13-86-2 (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., Dec.
12, 1988). This proceeding, which began with notice to San Francisco in January
1986, has already been to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals twice on peripheral
issues, and went through a full administrative hearing which resulted in a recom-
mended decision being issued on August 9, 1988. A decision by the FAA Admin-
istrator on December 12, 1988, is once more back in the courts.
It would also avoid the eccentric Boston-Logan situation in which the Massport
proposed revised fee structure was the subject of district court litigation, New
England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority, Civil Action 88-0873-
MA, (D. Mass June 29, 1988), as well as a formal administrative investigation. See
Investigation Into Massport's Landing Fees, FAA Docket 13-88-2 (U.S. Dep't of
Transp., Office of the Secretary Dec. 22, 1988). The latter resulted in an adminis-
trative law judge issuing a recommended decision on November 10, 1988, after a
formal hearing, and a decision by the Deputy Secretary issued on December 22,
1988. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court, in its June decision,
found the new Massport fees to be reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory.
The court noted, however, that its decision excluded corisideration of the obliga-
tions flowing from the Airport and Airway Improvement Act, since the Act and
the related grant agreements cannot be the basis for a private right of.action.
Deputy Secretary Dawson's December decision considered the district court's po-
sition, focusing on the same basic issues of reasonableness and discrimination in
the context of obligations flowing from the Airport and Airway Improvement Act
and related grant agreements, and came to the opposite conclusion. There must
be a better way.

